Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper develops the idea that, according to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, assertion is an aspect of the very form of propositions that could be represented by means of a pro-sentence. Then, given the assertive character inherent to propositions, a new formulation of the Frege-Geach problem is suggested. Drawing on a distinction between token-propositions and type-propositions, as well as on the conception of logical constants as operations, I ultimately present a possible Tractarian solution to this version of the Frege-Geach problem.
Source: Tópicos Revista de Filosofía
Author: Javier Vidal
Institution: University of Concepción
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4414628176
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