Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper presents a new problem for the standard semantics for ‘all’ and ‘every’ on which ‘every F is G’ and ‘all Fs are Gs’ are true just in case the set of things that satisfy ‘F’ is a subset of the set of things that satisfy ‘G’. I argue that the standard semantics makes highly counterintuitive predictions about what credences it is rational to adopt in a generalization ‘every F is G’ when we are confident but not certain that nothing is F. I show how, unlike the better-known counterintuitive result that if nothing is F, ‘every F is G’ is true, this problem cannot be avoided by appealing to pragmatic principles, nor by rejecting some orthodox principles about the relationship between credences and propositions.
Source: Analysis
Author: Matthew Simpson
Institution: University of Cambridge
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,798
OpenAlex ID: W4414794146
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