Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper seeks to identify a structural gap between the principle of freedom as independence and the law of torts in the common law tradition. Contrary to influential arguments made by contemporary proponents of this principle, I argue that independence can neither illuminate nor justify core areas of tort law. This shortcoming has broader implications for the larger question of what difference—that is, distinctive difference—tort law makes in moral space.
Source: Law and Philosophy
Author: Avihay Dorfman
Institutions: Tel Aviv University, The University of Texas at Austin
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,090
Funder: Tel Aviv University
OpenAlex ID: W4414806627
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