Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: It is alleged that imprecise probabilism can render one unable to update one’s credence in light of new evidence. While such belief inertia by itself is already quite worrying, I argue that it has other worrying epistemic implications that were previously unnoticed. It opens the possibility that one’s doxastic state depends not only on the evidence one has but also on the temporal order between awareness growth and evidence acquisition. I find this implication difficult to accept.
Source: Analysis
Author: Zhongwei Xu
Institution: London School of Economics and Political Science
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,798
OpenAlex ID: W4414930860
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