Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Fresh agricultural products have significant seasonality and perishability, and their cross-regional sales often face differences in market demand, price, and sales volume. In the context of government quality regulation, competition among retailers in different regions drives supply chain members to improve product quality, expand sales, and reduce losses. However, conflicts of interest under decentralized decision-making may lead to overall inefficiency. This article constructs a supply chain model consisting of a single Manufacturer and two regional Retailers to study the quality competition and coordination mechanism of cross-regional fresh food supply chains under government supervision. By comparing centralized and decentralized decision-making, it is found that although quality improvement in decentralized mode helps enhance competitiveness and sales performance, it is difficult to effectively increase profits and may even lead to a decline in profits. Therefore, this article proposes a cost-sharing contract to achieve supply chain coordination. Research has shown that this contract can effectively improve the overall profit of the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement; under high market demand and strict regulatory penalties, the total profit of the supply chain increases, but the dominant Retailer benefits more, which can easily trigger the “Matthew effect”. The research results reveal the comprehensive impact of quality investment, contract coordination, market demand fluctuations, and regulatory intensity on supply chain performance, providing theoretical basis and management insights for improving the collaborative efficiency and policy design of cross-regional fresh food supply chains.
Source: Games
DOI: 10.3390/g16050053
Authors: Chao Zhao, Yongmei Chi, Nini Gao, Jixiang Song
Language: English
Subfield: Management Information Systems
Domain: Social Sciences
SDG: Zero hunger
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,930
OpenAlex ID: W4415029295