Year: 2025
Type: preprint
Abstract: In the classic committee election setting each voter approves a subset of candidates and the goal is to select $k$ winners based on these preferences. A central focus of recent research in the area has been to achieve proportional representation. In this work, we explore notions of proportionality in a more expressive setting that allows voters to vote against candidates---a common feature on online polling platforms and beyond. We propose two conceptually distinct interpretations of negative votes, resulting in different perspectives of proportionality. In the first, preventing the election of disapproved candidates is as important to voters as electing approved ones. In the second, approvals and disapprovals are treated separately, with each receiving its own fairness guarantees. For each approach, we introduce suitable axioms capturing proportionality and examine their satisfiability by appropriate variants of Phragmén's rule, Proportional Approval Voting rule (PAV), and the Method of Equal Shares (MES).
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Kraiczy, Sonja, Papasotiropoulos, Georgios, Pierczyński, Grzegorz, Skowron, Piotr
Institution: University of Warsaw
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4415086089
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