Work

A Bayesian Equilibria in the Game of Effort Estimation in Agile Global Software Development

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: This research examines leader–team interactions in agile software development within a global context, with a focus on effort estimation. Drawing on principal–agent theory, we analyse the interaction on the assumption that the Scrum Master guides the development team under imperfect information. We model the interaction as a sequential game with incomplete information. In the first stage, the Scrum Master allocates resources to the development team; in the second stage, the team exerts effort. Both parties are characterised by types that capture their knowledge and skills. As these types are private information, we derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium to determine the equilibrium effort levels.

Source: International Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Problems and Informatics.

DOI: 10.61467/2007.1558.2025.v16i4.1020

Authors: María Guadalupe Medina-Barrera, Damián Emilio Gibaja-Romero, Rosa María Cantón-Croda

Institutions: Tecnológico Nacional de México, Instituto Tecnológico de Apizaco, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla

Language: English

Topic: Software Engineering Techniques and Practices

Subfield: Information Systems

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: diamond

OpenAlex ID: W4415089051

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