Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: I develop a theory of naturalness according to which properties are natural relative to categories of objects. This new theory avoids a problem that, I argue, afflicts standard theories: whereas standard theories allow for only one ordering of properties, considerations of the similarity and dissimilarity made by some negative properties—like having no parts, having no members, having no determinate mass, reflecting no visible light—require admitting more than one. Additionally, I argue that my view accounts for genuine categories, category mistakes, and negation as privation, and that it accounts for a distinction between characterizing and non-characterizing fundamentality.
Source: Synthese
Author: Thiago Xavier de Melo
Institution: Syracuse University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
Awards: G1164920944, G3999372454
OpenAlex ID: W4415242973