Work

Legislative hostage-taking

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: Legislative hostage-taking—whereby the minority party refuses to pass a bipartisan policy unless another divisive or contentious policy also passes—has become a frequent occurrence, especially in American politics. We develop a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and electoral politics to provide insights into why hostage-taking occurs, which policies are held hostage, and which policies are demanded as ransom. Our key insight is that (credible) hostage-taking can only occur if the divisive policy benefits the voter. Furthermore, when hostage-taking occurs, it benefits the voter. However, these benefits are potentially tempered if parties can engage in policy design. In particular, hostage-taking can generate a perverse incentive for the majority party to engage in money burning to shield themselves from the minority party’s hostage-taking.

Source: European Economic Review

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183

Authors: Giovanni Andreottola, Barton E. Lee

Institutions: Johannes Kepler University of Linz, ETH Zurich

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,690