Slot sharing for container shipping liners under service competition and demand uncertainty
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This study investigates the slot–sharing strategies of two container shipping liners (CSLs) engage in service competition within a shipping market characterized by uncertain demand. We develop a game–theoretic model where CSLs decide whether to enter a slot–sharing agreement and determine their service quality levels. Three typical agreements, namely, transfer–payment, revenue–sharing, and cost–sharing, are examined, with slot–sharing arrangements and transactions are implemented after demand uncertainty is realized. Equilibrium service quality levels and profits under different agreements are derived, and numerical experiments analyze the impacts of key parameters. We find that the transfer–payment agreement generally yields higher profits than the other two but reduces service quality due to diminished competition. Interestingly, we find that slot–sharing does not always outperform no slot–sharing. When service competition is intense and transfer–payment prices are low, the CSLs may achieve higher profits by operating independently. In addition, we demonstrate that slot–sharing can achieve a win–win situation where both service quality and CSL profits improve under moderate service competition and balanced transfer–payment prices.
Source: Frontiers in Marine Science
Authors: Shaorui Zhou, Jiayi He, Xiaopo Zhuo, Fan Wang
Institution: Sun Yat-sen University
Language: English
Topic: Maritime Ports and Logistics
Subfield: Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $3,801
Awards: G4880009653, G5728853660, G8623449276
OpenAlex ID: W4415373291