Year: 2025
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Channel Knowledge Map (CKM) is an emerging data-driven toolbox that captures our awareness of the wireless channel and enables efficient communication and resource allocation beyond the state of the art. In this work, we consider CKM for improving physical-layer security (PLS) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (Eve), without making any assumptions about Eve's location or channel state information (CSI). We employ highly directional mmWave transmissions, with the confidential message jointly encoded across multiple beams. By exploiting CKM, we derive an algorithm for time and power allocation among the beams that maximizes the absolute secrecy rate under the worst-case scenario for Eve's location.
Institution: Technische Universität Darmstadt
Language: English
Subfield: Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4415524593