Year: 2025
Type: article
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: In this paper, we study the selection patterns of individuals who manage to have their lay-off delayed around an age at lay-off threshold entitling them to four additional months of unemployment insurance, that is, manipulators. Using administrative data from Italy and bunching techniques, we document substantial manipulation around the cut-off and show that manipulators are selected on their long-term non-employment risk, but not on their moral hazard cost. Finally, we develop a sufficient statistics framework to assess how these findings affect optimal unemployment insurance duration in the presence of manipulation.
Source: The Economic Journal
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf105
Authors: Luca Citino, Kilian Russ, Vincenzo Scrutinio
Institutions: Bank of Italy, University of Bologna
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $4,463
OpenAlex ID: W4415544802
FWCI:
Cites:
Cited by:
Related to: