Work

Persuasion with verifiable information

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare them with commitment outcomes in information design. We provide conditions under which a commitment outcome is an equilibrium outcome and identify environments in which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. Our findings offer insights into the interchangeability of verifiability and commitment in applied settings.

Source: Journal of Economic Theory

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106102

Authors: Maria Titova, Kun Zhang

Institutions: Vanderbilt University, The University of Queensland

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,030

Funder: Vanderbilt University