Work

Silent Drain: From Energy Profiling to Practical Denial-of-Energy Attacks in 5G

Year: 2025

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: In this work, we present Silent Drain, a practical Denial-of-Energy attack against commercial 5G User Equipment (UE). Our approach combines extensive energy profiling across RRC states, DRX cycles, scheduling policies, MCS levels, and MIMO configurations with forged Downlink Control Information (DCI) messages that trigger high-consumption states. In a controlled testbed, we show that periodic DCI replays or forged uplink grants keep the UE in RRC Connected or induce persistent uplink transmissions, maintaining a +1 W power draw and continuous uplink activity for more than 30 minutes even after detachment. We discuss operational feasibility, testbed limitations, and propose potential counter-measures, including physical layer signaling authentication and energy-aware intrusion detection. Our findings reveal that energy efficiency mechanisms can become powerful and predictable attack vectors in 5G.

DOI: 10.1145/3737895.3768308

Authors: Alessandra Dino, Fabrizio Giuliano, Stefano Mangione, Domenico Garlisi, Ilenia Tinnirello

Institution: University of Palermo

Language: English

Topic: Green IT and Sustainability

Subfield: Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Field: Engineering

Domain: Physical Sciences

SDGs: Affordable and clean energy, Industry, innovation and infrastructure

Open Access status: gold

Funders: Sprint, European Commission

Awards: G2026644869, G4039943124, G507880695, G7205771190