Work

Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: In market design, mechanisms are often designed under strategy-proofness that requires all misreports be unprofitable. This is too restrictive, however, as participants may not strategically submit complicated misreports. Instead, we consider a condition that only precludes simple misreports that real-life participants could carry out. While there is no efficient Pareto improvement on the deferred acceptance under strategy-proofness, we find such a mechanism under our constraint: Kesten's (2010) efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance. Moreover, by extending our criterion to require that simple collective misreports be unprofitable, we provide characterizations of Kesten's mechanism. These findings offer valuable insights for practical market design.

Source: American Economic Journal Microeconomics

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230116

Author: Ryo Shirakawa

Institutions: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The University of Tokyo

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

Funder: Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University