Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Most agree that science is in some way informed by values, especially when it comes to using a model. However, whether values in science impact epistemology remains controversial. Prima facie scientific knowledge impurism seems untenable (Gerken, 2018). Does the same hold for scientific understanding impurism? In this paper, I put forward the dependency-impurism view of scientific understanding where non-epistemic values encroach on the dependency models that underly scientific understanding. I argue that dependency-impurism does not face the same worries that scientific knowledge impurism may have. I discuss the larger implications dependency-impurism has for scientific understanding, discovery, and machine learning in science.
Source: Philosophical Studies
Author: Emily Sullivan
Institution: University of Edinburgh
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W4415652845