Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments—Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player’s contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.
Source: Games
DOI: 10.3390/g16060058
Author: Jobst Heitzig
Institution: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,930
OpenAlex ID: W4415928748
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