Year: 2025
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) offer an attractive alternative for cryptographic key generation by leveraging intrinsic manufacturing variations, thus eliminating the need for permanent key storage. Among them, RO-PUFs—based on ring oscillators—are widely studied due to their simplicity and efficiency. While the sensitivity of individual ROs to laser fault injection has been previously explored, this paper presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first experimental demonstration of a successful laser attack directly impacting the global output of an RO-PUF system implemented on an Artix-7 FPGA. We show that a localized laser injection can selectively alter the frequencies of targeted ROs, leading to deterministic changes in the PUF response. Our results reveal a significant physical vulnerability of RO-PUFs to this type of attack, highlighting the need to develop appropriate countermeasures.
Institutions: Institut polytechnique de Grenoble, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Techniques of Informatics and Microelectronics for Integrated Systems Architecture, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, Mines Saint-Étienne, Laboratoire de Conception et d'Intégration des Systèmes, Université Grenoble Alpes
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Agence Nationale de la Recherche
OpenAlex ID: W4416012261
