Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: I provide an example in which Bayesian conditionalisation fails to validate plausible claims about rational permissibility. The example suggests that conditionalisation should be treated as a heuristic principle: useful in many situations, but not all. This raises the question of how to characterise the cases in which it is appropriate to use conditionalisation. I show that one can answer this question by appealing to the framework of objective Bayesian inductive logic to provide sufficient conditions for the applicability of conditionalisation.
Source: Analysis
Author: Jon Williamson
Institution: University of Manchester
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,798
OpenAlex ID: W4416049035
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