Bargaining hard or hardly bargaining? Brexit and the populist renegotiation of international agreements
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Populist leaders increasingly oppose agreements negotiated by their predecessors, claiming their more forceful approach can offer a ‘better deal’. Yet third parties have no incentive to negotiate a worse outcome for themselves with these leaders, who often negotiate from a less propitious bargaining position than their predecessors. How, then, can populist leaders claim success in negotiations? This article argues populist leaders weaken previously ambitious demands to successfully achieve new agreements. By de-scoping their negotiating demands, identifying symbolic wins and narrating conflictual interactions with negotiating partners, leaders can obtain novel agreements to sell to their domestic base. Empirically the article examines Boris Johnson’s ‘renegotiation’ of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and his negotiation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) post-Brexit, drawing on elite interviews. The findings suggest renegotiation is a more cooperative venture than populist leaders portray and show how negotiating ambition can be traded for symbolic victories.
Author: Benjamin Martill
Institution: University of Edinburgh
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4416247718