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Knowledge-specific epistemic injustice

Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This article introduces knowledge-specific epistemic injustice as a third kind of epistemic injustice beside group-based or content-specific epistemic injustice. Knowledge-specific epistemic injustice is caused by a prejudice towards specific forms of knowledge, for example, practical, embodied, or experiential knowledge. The article shows that discounting these forms of knowledge silences knowers in a similar way as prejudice towards certain groups and their capacity as knowers. Thus, in order to achieve full epistemic justice and to overcome unjust power structures upheld by and based on unfairly distributed epistemic resources, all forms of epistemic injustice must be addressed.
Source: Inquiry
Language: English
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4416447313
FWCI: 1.844
Cites: 23
Cited by: 1
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