Work

A tale of conflicting principals: Candidate selection, party structure, and the politics of federal de/centralization

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: Centralization in federal countries can be explained by the incentives that a party’s selectorate generates for legislators. This paper examines how intra-party institutional structures shape federal decentralization by analyzing how Candidate Selection Decentralization (CSD) affects the vertical allocation of policy authority across 11 federations. Using within-country variation, I find a quadratic relationship between CSD and legislative decentralization. As CSD increases, legislators face Competing Principals Problems (CPP) between national leaders and subnational selectorates, weakening party cohesion. Yet this effect is non-linear: centralized selection fosters cohesion and centralization, while fully decentralized selection also reinforces centralization due to coordination failures. In contrast, intermediate levels of CSD—where subnational elites control nominations—empower state-level actors who promote decentralizing reforms in electorally or fiscally salient policy areas. These findings underscore the institutional role of intra-party rules in shaping the vertical distribution of power in federal systems.

Source: Party Politics

DOI: 10.1177/13540688251401804

Author: Joel Mendoza Gómez

Institution: Rice University

Language: English

Topic: Political Systems and Governance

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,650