Work

Gamson's Law in the City Hall: The Populist Radical Right and the Dilemma of Allocating Municipal Portfolios in Sweden

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT Does the proportional distribution of office payoffs between coalition partners, known as ‘Gamson's Law’, hold at the local level? And can the inclusion of a populist radical right (PRR) party in a coalition lead to deviations from this law? This article addresses these two questions by examining municipal coalitions that were formed following the 2022 Swedish elections. I demonstrate that Gamson's Law proves relevant at the municipal level in Sweden but find that the PRR Sweden Democrats (SD) face, on average, a disproportional allocation unmatched by any other party. I find that the inclusion of SD is, by far, the most substantively significant factor driving disproportionality. I suggest that relinquishing office positions corresponds to a specific price that the PRR is willingly paying to facilitate inclusion within municipal coalitions. This article contributes to a growing body of literature examining the relevance of Gamson's Law at the municipal level. Furthermore, it identifies a new pattern of deviation relating to the inclusion of a PRR party, inviting researchers to further explore the PRR's impact on coalition politics.

Source: Scandinavian Political Studies

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9477.70031

Author: Marius Perrin

Institutions: Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Centre d'études Européennes de Sciences Po

Language: English

Topic: Electoral Systems and Political Participation

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,950