Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Non-compete clauses (NCCs) are widely used and discussed, but often too narrowly. While conventional accounts focus on the benefits of NCCs to employers, Harrison Frye has proposed that they can also serve employees by acting as a clear, costly signal. I argue that both views rely on an overly narrow analysis. A wider view shows that NCCs cause market failures, undermining their utility as protective or signalling devices. Because of these negative effects, I extend Frye’s account to argue that NCCs should be used only as targeted interventions under exceptional conditions, if they are used at all.
Source: Economics and Philosophy
Author: David Anders Ween
Institution: Tulane University
Language: English
Topic: Labor Law and Work Dynamics
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W4416675789