Work

Assigning tasks to pairs

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: We study the problem of an organization that has a large number of potential tasks and has to choose which tasks to handle and which pair of experts should be assigned to each of them. We propose a mechanism that generates a Pareto-efficient assignment in the weak core and is group strategy-proof. The assignment rule generated by this mechanism is characterized by four axioms: Pareto-efficiency, the Weak Core property, Restricted Maskin Monotonicity and Invariance with respect to Deleted Links. The last two axioms are invariance properties with respect to specific preference changes.

Source: Economic Theory

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01693-x

Authors: Antonio Nicolò, Pietro Salmaso, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav

Institutions: University of Padua, University of Manchester, University of Naples Federico II, Indian Statistical Institute, University of Liverpool

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,090

Funder: Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II