How do negotiators resolve conflict over resources of changing value: The role of trust in sequential negotiations.
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: = 330), we systematically investigate when and why negotiation dyads succeed or fail in reaching efficient agreements in sequential allocation negotiations, thereby leveraging the changing value of resources. Because trust may be an important psychological factor in reaching efficient agreements in such sequential negotiations, we manipulated trust levels (high vs. low) between negotiating pairs and progressively increased its relevance across experiments. Across both distribution (Experiments 1 and 2) and contribution negotiations (Experiment 3) and regardless of trust, dyads consistently prioritized resolving immediate conflicts of interest during the initial negotiation, failing to leverage changes in resource values and limiting their ability to reach efficient agreements over time. Integrating elements from environmental, social, and negotiation psychology, this research highlights challenges in sequential negotiations with dynamic resource values and provides a basis for evidence-based interventions to enhance agreement efficiency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
DOI: 10.1037/xap0000555
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Funder: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Award: G3172442230
OpenAlex ID: W4416864100
