Work

Putting Things Into (Rational) Perspective: Normative Reasons and Their Rational Accessibility

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: Perspectivism about reasons is commonly understood as the view that normative reasons depend on an agent’s epistemic perspective: a fact counts as a reason only if it is epistemically accessible to the agent. This paper argues that perspectivists’ near-exclusive focus on an agent’s epistemic perspective obscures another important dimension of perspective dependence – namely, that reasons can also depend on an agent’s rational perspective. Specifically, I propose that, in addition to epistemic accessibility, a further necessary condition for a fact to qualify as a reason is its rational accessibility – that is, the agent must have decisive reason to access the fact. Recognizing the rational accessibility of reasons offers considerable theoretical leverage: it substantially improves the two leading perspectivist accounts, with notable implications for the broader dialectic, and it promises to illuminate central normative phenomena, such as key instances of normative latitude.

Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

DOI: 10.1007/s10677-025-10530-y

Author: Marcel Jahn

Institution: Stockholm University

Language: English

Topic: Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,290

Funders: Universität Bielefeld, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Stockholms Universitet