Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Disagreement is common. What happens when epistemic peers disagree over some issue p, where A believes p but B believes not-p? Conciliationism says that both A and B should suspend judgment after learning of their disagreement. But suppose A is the first to assert on the matter. B is then the first to learn of their disagreement. Does B have warrant to assert not-p in response? Answering this question leads to a surprising conclusion: the epistemic norm of assertion is incompatible with conciliationism.
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaf101
Author: Russell Ming
Institution: University of California, Irvine
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $4,204
Funder: Universität zu Köln
OpenAlex ID: W4417043952