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Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective

Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Farmers’ low-carbon transition has become a critical issue for achieving sustainable agricultural development. Fundamentally, this transition is driven by multi-actor collaboration and is subject to stochastic disturbances. However, the collaborative governance mechanisms that facilitate farmers’ low-carbon transformation remain insufficiently understood, particularly under the influence of random factors. To address this gap, we construct a four-party game model involving farmers, government, enterprises, and financial institutions by employing a stochastic evolutionary game approach that incorporates random disturbance factors to capture real-world uncertainty. Numerical simulations are conducted to examine how different policy tools and external environments shape the system’s evolutionary path. The results show the following: (1) In the early transition stage, external uncertainties cause notable fluctuations in strategy evolution, during which the government, farmers, and enterprises gradually form a collaborative mechanism, while financial institutions remain reluctant to participate due to risk and policy uncertainty. (2) Government subsidies, profit returns, and risk-sharing mechanisms exhibit a substitutive relationship, and an appropriate mix of these tools can effectively enhance the willingness of farmers and enterprises to adopt low-carbon practices. (3) Excessive government incentives may crowd out the role of green credit from financial institutions. (4) The profit-sharing ratio among farmers exerts the strongest motivational effect in the early stage, while higher levels of risk-sharing and reputation benefits are more effective in stabilizing the system structure and enhancing transition resilience. This study reveals the dynamic mechanisms of multi-actor interaction in agricultural low-carbon transition and provides theoretical and policy insights for differentiated government strategies and collaborative emission reduction.
Authors: Deyu Zhao, Shang Xia
Institution: Fudan University
Language: English
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,896
OpenAlex ID: W4417106791
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