Do newly elected mayors cut their own pay?
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Using data from the 2023 Spanish municipal elections, we show that newly elected mayors who replace incumbents from a different ideological bloc reduce their own pay upon taking office—by about 6 and 13 percentage points of the legal maximum in left-to-right and right-to-left turnovers, respectively—relative to reelected incumbents. No such adjustment occurs when the incoming mayor shares the predecessor’s ideological orientation. The pattern of results is consistent with a costly‐signaling mechanism in which ideological outsiders use early pay cuts to credibly convey otherwise hard-to-observe attributes. More broadly, the findings suggest a previously unexplored way in which electoral turnover may shape local political behavior.
Source: Economics Letters
Author: Jacint Balaguer
Institution: Universitat Jaume I
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,030
Funder: Universitat Jaume I
Award: G7966560283
OpenAlex ID: W4417166245
