Emission Markets Linkage and Strategic Environmental Policy
Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT This study develops a strategic environmental policy model with linked emission permit markets. We examine whether a cooperative outcome can emerge when exporting countries act non‐cooperatively. We endogenize the participation decision through a specific permit revenue‐sharing scheme. This allows the cooperative outcome to be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Asymmetries across countries regarding abatement technologies and environmental preferences affect the optimal distribution of the permit revenue. Whenever these asymmetries remain within a certain range, the cooperative outcome in the non‐cooperative solution is implementable.
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70089
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,950
OpenAlex ID: W4417258405
