Year: 2025
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper studies populations of individuals -- that we call homo-felix -- who maximise an objective function that we call happiness. The happiness of one individual depends on the payoffs that they receive in games they play with their peers as well as on the happiness of the peers they interact with, and on their status. Individuals care more or less about others depending on whether that makes them more or less happy. This paper analyses the ``happiness feedback loops'' that result from these interactions in simple settings. We find that individuals revise their other-regarding attitudes in terms of relative comparisons. In particular, individuals tend to care more about individuals who are happier than them, while spiteful behavior may emerge only under poor socio-economic conditions and is directed towards the worst off individuals. Such general results are illustrated by studying simple 2 x 2 games, where we find that homo-felix can converge to a variety of equilibria which includes but goes beyond Nash equilibria, and in an $n$-persons public good game.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4417353138