Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Conflicting desire ascriptions — ascriptions of the form ⌜S wants p⌝ and ⌜S wants ¬p⌝ — falsify every extant semantics that takes the orthodox, and theoretically powerful, belief-based approach to desire ascriptions. In many cases, these semantics wrongly predict that conflicting desire ascriptions can’t both be true. In response, I propose a semantics of some-things-considered, other-things-ignored desire, which I model with questions — lending further evidence to the view that questions are central in our cognitive lives. EARLY ACCESS
Source: Semantics and Pragmatics
DOI: 10.3765/sp.18.11
Author: Milo Phillips-Brown
Institution: University of Edinburgh
Language: English
Subfield: Language and Linguistics
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4417434818
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