Incentives for Truthful Information Elicitation of Continuous Signals
Year: 2014
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: We consider settings where a collective intelligence is formed by aggregating information contributed from many independent agents, such as product reviews, community sensing, or opinion polls. We propose a novel mechanism that elicits both private signals and beliefs. The mechanism extends the previous versions of the Bayesian Truth Serum (the original BTS, the RBTS, and the multi-valued BTS), by allowing small populations and non-binary private signals, while not requiring additional assumptions on the belief updating process. For priors that are sufficiently smooth, such as Gaussians, the mechanism allows signals to be continuous.
Authors: Goran Radanovic, Boi Faltings
Institution: École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W5354901