Moral Cognition and Emotion: A Dual-Process Model of Moral Judgment
Year: 2011
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Cognitive and emotional processes both seem to contribute in the production of moral judgments, but how they interact is still under investigation. Greene’s dual-process model suggests that these processes constitute dissociable systems in the brain, which are hypothesized to give rise to two qualitatively different ways of moral thinking characterized by two normative moral theories, consequentialism and deontology. Greene indicates that this research undermine deontology as a normative theory. The empirical investigation of moral judgments implies that the dual-process model only seems to accurately predict and explain moral judgments in moral dilemmas involving physical harmful intentions. Regardless of the models empirical support, the empirical findings in the study of moral judgments could have normative and metaethical implications.
Author: Jessica I. Määttä
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W569011744