Year: 2015
Type: article
Abstract: In her work on moral psychology and ethics, G. E. M. Anscombe articulates the Intended/Foreseen (I/F) distinction.Briefly, as the name indicates, the distinction contrasts the intended aspects of one's act from those that one foresees, but does not intend.Anscombe insists that this distinction has great moral significance, even when applied to acts having comparable consequences.So, for example, Anscombe proposes that the intentional targeting of civilians (terror bombing) ethically differs from bombing a legitimate military target while concomitantly harming non-combatants with foresight but without intent (tactical bombing).While few deny that intent differs from foresight, some question the ethical relevance of contrasting the two in cases of consequentially comparable acts, such as (some) instances of terror and tactical bombing.This paper presents Anscombe's reasons for regarding this distinction as one of signal ethical import.According to Anscombe, one finds the moral significance of the distinction in its relation to absolute prohibitions, the intrinsic badness of certain acts, the nature of virtue and vice, and, finally, the moral import of moral psychology itself.
Author: Thomas A. Cavanaugh
Institution: University of San Francisco
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W595575218