Year: 2004
Type: article
Abstract: This article is intended as an accompaniment to Anthony Freeman's review of Preston and Bishop's collection, Views into the Chinese Room, reflecting on some pertinent outstanding questions about the Chinese room argument (CRA).Although there is general agreement in the artificial intelligence (AI) community that the CRA is somehow wrong, debate continues on exactly why and how it is wrong.Is there a killer counter-argument and, if so, what is it?One remarkable fact is that the CRA is prototypically a thought experiment, yet it has been very little discussed from the perspective of thought experiments in general.Here, I argue that the CRA fails as a thought experiment because it commits the fallacy of undersupposing, i.e., it leaves too many details to be filled in by the audience.Since different commentators will often fill in details differently, leading to different opinions of what constitutes a decisive counter, the result is 21-plus years of inconclusive debate.There can be few contributions to the literature of artificial intelligence (AI), cognitive science and the philosophy of mind to rival Searle's 1980 paper introducing the Chinese room argument (CRA) for the debate and controversy which it has engendered.It is certainly remarkable that this short paper continues to be argued over after all these years.The present article is intended as an accompaniment to Anthony Freeman's review of Views into the Chinese Room, edited by Preston and Bishop (2002) to mark the 21st anniversary of the CRA's first appearance.
Author: R.I. Damper
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W60356041
