Essays on fiscal decentralization, institutions and ethnic conflict
Year: 2010
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This dissertation investigates the relationships between institutional quality, fiscal decentralization and ethnic conflict. We especially endorse the idea that taking into account institutions helps understanding the incidence of ethnic conflict. In the first chapter we assume that violent conflicts emanate either from an institutional failure or, in contrast, from a strong bureaucratic efficacy coupled with a willingness to discriminate minorities. 3SLS results show that both effects are simultaneously taking place. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate whether fiscal decentralization is an efficient conflict-mitigating institution. Results based on panel data in chapter 2 suggest that fiscal decentralization is a useful device. In contrast, the interactions between institutional quality and fiscal decentralization appear as more complex than assumed. The chapter 3 explores in length the preference-matching role of fiscal decentralization, taking into account recent models of political economy and introducing a distinction between local majorities and minorities. Estimations confirm that fiscal decentralization is desirable for local majorities but is found to stir violence amongst local minorities. The last chapter offers a microeconomic analysis of the interaction between a CDD program and local political institutions in Senegal. It reveals that the allocation of projects depends on political and geographical factors, originating from political leadership. However, the ethnic factor is insignificant to explain the leadership and some of the electoral imbalances are corrected through institutions created by the program.
Source: HAL
Author: Tranchant, Jean-Pierre
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W607687926
