Lobbying as Subsidies (based on R. Hall's Theory of "legislative Subsidy")
Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: The article continues investigations of theoretical aspects of lobbying. The author reveals the specificity of lobbyists’ relationships with political stakeholders based on the in-depth analysis of R. Hall’s theory of “legislative subsidy” [4, p. 6984]. R. Hall used the developed approach to explain the process of lobbying at the level of legislation the U.S. Congress. Particular attention is given to strengths and weaknesses of Hall’s approach. The article considers the typology of the most common needs of officials aimed at strengthening of their positions in the bureaucratic ladder that may be satisfied by professional lobbyists. The author provides a practical example analyzing the process of tobacco control in Russia. The researcher comes to a conclusion that lobbyists do subsidize a wide range of political stakeholders (even the opponents on the matters within the scope of their professional interests) apart from the representatives of legislatures, as it was stated by R. Hall.
Author: Павел Александрович Толстых
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $80
OpenAlex ID: W627613003
