Year: 2007
Type: article
Abstract: Turkey's ties to Russia have received considerable attention in the recent past. Since the end of the Cold War scholars, observers and policy-makers have shed lots of ink trying to make sense of various aspects of the tics between Turkey and Russia. (Bazoglu Sezer, 1997, 2000, 2001; Gul 2004; Ogan 2004, 2006; Akgun and Aydin 1999; Tellal 2001; Sever 2001; Selcuk 2005; Kazgan 1998; Efegil 2001; Trenin 1997; Bilge 1997; Kimklioglu 2001, 2006; Kazgan and Ulcenko 2003; Nadein-Ravesky 1999; Warhola and Mitchell 2006; Akturk 2006; Hill 2003; Hill and Taspinar 2006a; Hill and Taspinar 2006b). While, in the late 1990s, some of these scholars and observers used terms such as cold peace, (Bilge 1997: 92) and schizophrenic, (Trenin 1997: 57) to describe the relations between the two countries, and ruled out any strategic between Moscow and Ankara in the medium (Allison 1999: 36), in the early 2000s, the term that was used to describe the ties between the two countries was virtual rapprochement, (Bazoglu Sezer 2001: 62) indicating the thawing ice. Recently, in 2005, however, Russia was accused of launching little-noticed charm offensive (Holbrooke, 2005) towards Turkey, and then, Turkey and Russia were credited for joining forces and shifting towards Eurasianism (Salhani, 2005) and forming an axis of the excluded (Hill and Taspinar 2006b) highlighting the possibility of a creation of a quasi-alliance between Turkey and Russia. It is true that the relations between Turkey and Russia have improved immensely, but can we talk of quasialliances, axes or couplings between the two? This article is an overview of factors, mostly from a Turkish perspective, that changed the nature of ties between Turkey and Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It argues that the improvement of these ties is a dual normalization, and can be attributed to three overlapping developments: diminishing of the factors that elevated levels of mutual threat perception in Turkey and Russia; Russia's emergence as a profitable market for Turkish entrepreneurs as well as the Turkish elite's drive to make Turkey an energy hub; and, Vladimir Putin's goal to make foreign economic relations one of the priority areas in Russian foreign policy. In other words, the economic normalization began a long time ago, but political normalization had to wait for the diminishing of the threat present in both countries. The paper unfolds in three parts. The first section following this introduction elaborates on the events that contributed to the increasing threat in Russia and Turkey, and how the disappearance of these issues from the agenda has changed threat in both countries. The second section examines the dynamics of the economic ties between the two countries. The conclusion highlights possible problem areas that might emerge between Turkey and Russia and explains why quasi-alliances or axes between Turkey and Russia seem quite unlikely in the near future. The Diminishing Threat Perceptions History has been more than generous with both Turkey and Russia providing them enough opportunities to create mutually held enemy images. Thus, it is impossible to talk about relations between Turkey and Russia without the role of perceptions (Bazoglu Sezer 1992: 227; 2000: 62; Harris 1995: 3; Ogan 2004: 98; Hill and Taspinar 2006: 81). Though mutually held threat originated in the period in which both countries were empires, the discord between Turkey and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II also was crucial for the creation of the enemy image and a sprawling enemy discourse. The Soviet demands for Turkish territory and basing rights in the Turkish Straits at the end of World War II not only forced Turkey to choose sides and attach itself to the Western security system, but also led to the labeling of the Soviet Union as a source of threat. …
Author: Lerna K. Yanık
Language: English
Topic: Historical Turkish Studies
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W67346667