SLOW: spread-spectrum logic as side-channel countermeasure using wideband clocks
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are increasingly affected by side-channel attacks. As this trend continuesto rise, it is mandatory to design countermeasures for these attacks. Therefore, this thesis describes the design of acountermeasure that does not only defend against remote attacks but also has the property to be portable to differentFPGA and SoC devices. Additionally, the proposed system is extendable to defend against different attack vectors. Tosustain the portability and simultaneously create an extendable solution, it is mandatory to have background knowledgeabout side-channel attacks. This knowledge is included in the thesis and contains information on how such attacksand countermeasures are built and the mechanism of action of a side-channel data transfer. Additionally, the mainmechanisms of the individual side-channel attacks are declared, and the physical properties are introduced. To createa countermeasure for sidechannel-attacks interference circuits play a vital role. These are the main building blocks forthe proposed countermeasure and can also be used for a Trojan design. Therefore, they are the focus of this work, too.These circuits are analyzed for the proposed key parameters area usage, portability, and resolution, and the implementedcircuits are verified with measurements. Additionally, the main steps for optimizing their use as a countermeasure and aTrojan are presented. Additionally, this thesis shows the needed step to use interference circuits as measurement devicesfor the countermeasure. This step is necessary to increase the portability, as there is no need for specialized hardware likeADCs. Furthermore, the key parameters for designing a Trojan are included, and the countermeasure is verified againstan injected Trojan. As an outlook, this thesis provides potential improvements for the developed countermeasure.This countermeasure can be enhanced as a multi-side-channel defense against voltage, electromagnetic radiation, andtemperature attacks. The designs for this improvement are rudimentary implemented, and elementary measurementshave been done to verify the functionality. Finally, the results are discussed, and the benefits and drawbacks of thesolution are clarified.
Source: reposiTUm (TU Wien)
Author: Braun, Felix Georg
Institution: TU Wien
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6890107078
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