Double Binds and the Logic of Ambiguity: A Batesonian Model of Strategic Entrapment in Game Theory
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper introduces the Bateson Game, a novel game-theoretic framework based on Gregory Bateson's concept of the double bind. We model double binds as two-player signaling games with frame ambiguity, in which all possible receiver responses lead to dissonant or negative outcomes due to contradictory interpretive frames (literal vs. meta). The model demonstrates how power is exerted through control of the interpretive context. We present both a formal definition and a simulation of adaptive agents under strategic ambiguity.
Author: Kevin Fathi
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6893156773
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