Work

What We May Expect of Each Other

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: In this article, I present an informative account of moral obligations in terms of reasons and show how it can be put to use to solve some pressing problems in moral philosophy. The core idea is that for agents to be morally required to f is for them to have reasons to f that are at the same time reasons for everyone to expect them to f. This expectation view captures both the first-personal deliberative as well as the socio-emotional dimension of moral obligations. Over and above, it provides illuminating explanations of supererogation and the imperatival character of moral requirements.

Source: Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.16780064

Author: Kiesewetter, Benjamin

Institution: Bielefeld University

Language: English

Topic: Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: European Commission

Award: G8484094376