Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Drayson (2017) explores the relationship between predictive and modular architectures of the mind and concludes that predictive architectures must exhibit some kind of modularity. To do so, Drayson discusses two requirements of predictive architectures that seem to conflict with modular architectures: the continuity claim, the idea that cognition and perception rest on a continuum, and the non-isolation claim, the idea that no brain processes are informationally isolated. Although these features seem to repel modular architectures, Drayson finds reasons for reconciliation. In this paper, I explain such reasons and provide difficulties in Drayson’s argumentation. I conclude that there is no place for reconciliations.
DOI: 10.30827/trif.32705
Author: Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa
Institution: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W6946316591