Year: 2025
Type: preprint
Abstract: How does one test empirically the hypothesis that a decision maker (DM) is being influenced by information via Bayesian persuasion? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, who sees the conditional distribution of choices given the state. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the dataset to be consistent with the DM being Bayesian persuaded by an unobserved sender who generates a distribution of signals to ex-ante optimize the sender's expected payoff. I thereby provide a tool for empirical work on information design.
Author: Mensch, Jeffrey
Institution: Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6947719863
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