Work

Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation

Year: 2025

Type: preprint

Abstract: We consider object allocation problems with capacities where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that a probabilistically monotonic lottery rule satisfies ex-post Pareto efficiency if and only if it satisfies ex-post pairwise efficiency and ex-post nonwastefulness. This result allows us to strengthen various existing characterization results, both for lottery rules and for deterministic rules, by replacing (ex-post) Pareto efficiency with (ex-post) pairwise efficiency and (ex-post) non-wastefulness, e.g., for characterizations of the Random Serial Dictatorship rule (Basteck, 2025), Trading Cycles rules (Pycia and Unver, 2017), and Hierarchical Exchange rules (Papai, 2000).

Source: arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2508.05340

Authors: Demeulemeester, Tom, Klaus, Bettina

Institutions: Maastricht School of Management, Maastricht University, University of Lausanne

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: National Science Foundation, Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung

Awards: Probabilistic Matching Markets: Is there a Fairest Mechanism of them All?, Automatic recognition of general unconstrained handwritten text

OpenAlex ID: W6947738115

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