Evolutionary Game of Port Behavior and Government Supervision under Carbon Quota Mechanisms
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper explores the impact of exploring government regulation on the use of green technologies in ports under the carbon quota mechanism. It shows that: (1) static reward and punishment mechanism is easy to lead to system oscillation and difficult to stabilize; (2) dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can promote the use of shore power in ports; (3) increasing government punishment can enhance the probability of shore power use and reduce the intensity of regulation; (4) increasing government incentives reduces the intensity of government regulation, and the probability of shore power use in ports decreases; and (5) moderately decreasing the carbon quota can accelerate the system to reach stability. And it provides theoretical support for policy optimization.
Authors: Xiaofei Zhou, Man Yang
Institution: Shanghai Maritime University
Language: English
Subfield: Environmental Engineering
Field: Environmental Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6959712276
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