Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: In Pragmatist Semantics, Zalabardo argues that sentences can be used to represent the world even when they have pragmatist meaning grounds (that is, even when we give pragmatist, use-based answers to metasemantic questions about what makes those sentences mean what they do). In this paper, I discuss the conditions for representationality to which Zalabardo resorts to assess the representational nature of speech with pragmatist meaning grounds. I suggest that these conditions only manage to capture a thin notion of representation, which would count as representational, for instance, relativistic speech about personal taste. I conclude by suggesting that Zalabardo’s thesis can be vindicated if we adopt a form of global pragmatism.
DOI: 10.30827/trif.32782
Author: Javier González de Prado Salas
Institution: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
Language: English
Subfield: Language and Linguistics
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W6964601883