The Unity and Plurality of Vague Perception
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Some perceptual experiences appear vague. How should a representationalist about perception explain vague perceptual experiences? I argue that paradigmatic representationalist views of perceptual vagueness such as the perceptual confidence view and the determinable content view are phenomenologically inadequate because they fail to satisfy plausible phenomenological desiderata for any view of perceptual vagueness. I develop a phenomenologically adequate view within a modified capacitist framework. The developed view has repercussions for other problematic cases such as double vision and Anscombe’s matchboxes.
Source: Digital Archive @ GSU
DOI: 10.57709/pas3-w457
Author: Yanke Du
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6973957415
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