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Closing the Door on Subjective Reasonableness: Evaluating Police-Created Exigencies and the Issues with the Doctrinal Shift to Objectivity in Warrantless Searches

Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: 2 Compare U.S. CONST.amend.IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."),and Brigham City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398,403 (2oo6) ("Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."),with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (showing that an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is an exigent circumstance), and United States v. Simmons, 66i F 3 d 151 (2d Cir.2o i) (When "the exigencies of [a] situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable" no warrant is needed to enter the home).3 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,586-88 (980).4 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004); United States v. Bank, 540 U.S. 31, 40 (2003); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-32 (2001); Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, I00(1990).5 See Simmons, 66I E3d 151 (2d Cit.2011) (holding that an objective standard should be employed in measuring exigent circumstances and police action); United States v. Mowatt, 513 E 3 d 395 (4th Cir.2008) (using a reasonably foreseeable, subjective approach); United States v. Coles, 437 F3d 361, 367-70 (3d Cit.2006) (focusing on the reasonableness of police actions to determine if exigent circumstances exist); United States v. Williams, 354 F. 3 d 497, 504-05 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that police cannot create exigent circumstances even when they have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed); Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 E3d 492,504 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that a search is invalid if police deliberately create the exigency to avoid the warrant requirement).[Vol.I0I CLOSING THE DOOR ON SUBJECTIVITY circumstances was weakened as a result of King 11,1 ° and it appears that courts are applying this new test in varying degrees.This note will explain that the objective standard within the policecreated exigency exception to the doctrine of exigent circumstances created in King II, supported only by one circuit," is contrary to the fundamental notion that searches are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment barring very limited exceptions and is currently being-and will continue to be-misconstrued among the circuits based on the regional histories of this doctrine.12 King 11 was supposed to resolve a split among the courts, but rather, as this note will highlight, it shifted the doctrinal safeguards to grant police more discretion and created a rift in evaluating police-created exigencies, forcing courts to choose between core underlying Fourth Amendment principles and a surprising Supreme Court decision.3 This note is divided into seven parts.Part I outlines the power behind the Fourth Amendment with a particular emphasis on the various exceptions to the warrant requirement that courts have developed through decades of meticulous jurisprudence.This will include a historical review of the doctrinal components of exigent circumstances that existed up to King II.Part II focuses on King I, highlighting the Kentucky Supreme Court's unanimous decision regarding the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine, providing the factual background to the suppression issues at the trial level, and comparing the Kentucky Appeals Court decision with that of the Kentucky Supreme Court.This will serve to place the legal issue that was "resolved" by the United States Supreme Court in its proper context.Part III will discuss and explain the circuit split as it existed prior to King II, foreshadow the various ways in which the circuits will begin applying the tempest holding of King H, and enumerate the authority and rationale employed in the use of these doctrinal tests.Part IV will explain Kentucky's unanimous decision in Kingl, which was overturned in KingI.io SeeKingll, 131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).i1 See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir.199o); King l, 302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Ky.2010) ("The Second Circuit appears to give the most deference to law enforcement....").12 This is not the first time that the power of the Fourth Amendment has been questioned and changed abruptly by the Supreme Court.See generally Alfredo Garcia, Toward an Integrated Vision of Criminal Procedural Rights: A Counter to Judicial and Academic Nihilism, 77 MARQ.L. REV. 1, 2 (1993) (citing Bruce A. Green, "Power Not Reason": Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court's I99O Term, 70 N.C.L. REv.373 ( 1992)) (pointing out that the Supreme Court has "employed interpretive principle, policy, and precedent in an inconsistent fashion to yield a restrictive construction of the Fourth Amendment in every case").13 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (stating that the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect against "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of [I liberty, and the fundamental principles of law .. "); see also Garcia, supra note 12, at 8 (noting that the Fourth Amendment is a basic freedom and that misuse of warrants is what sparked the American Revolution). 2012-2013]19 U.S. CONST.amend.IV.2o King 11, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing U.S. CONST.amend.IV).21 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("The Fourth Amendment protects people .... ).See generally Garcia, supra note 12, at 1-2 (noting that the scope of criminal procedural rights stems from safeguards in the "value-laden" Bill of Rights).22 These exceptions are not absolute and are subject to judicial review.See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971 ) (holding that exceptions to the warrant requirement are not talismans precluding further judicial inquiry whenever they are invoked); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,499 (1958) (noting that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "jealously and carefully drawn"); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (951)) ("The general requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on those seeking [an] exemption [from the requirement] to show the need for it.23 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).24 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (I99O).25 Arizona v. Gant, 5S6 U.S. 332 (2009).26 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).27 United States v. Neal, No. i1-OZ8 Section: R(3),
Authors: Mowen, Lincoln Gordon
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2797189950
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